Politically Correct Information Adoption by Holm, Håkan
Politically Correct Information Adoption
By Håkan Holm
July, 2000
Abstract: This paper analyses the case when the political struggle not is channeled through
policy choices, but through what information to adopt. The paper presents a simple model to
analyze collective decisions of adopting new information when different parties' payoffs are
contingent upon the new information. In equilibrium we demonstrate that the adopted
information is biased towards “political correctness” rather than being informative (in the
Blackwell sense). These results may be relevant when designing decision mechanisms for
institutions that are to be keen on new information.
Keywords: Informativeness, Majority Rule, Political Correctness.
JEL: D23, D70, D72, D81, L30.
* Associate Professor at the Department of Economics, University of Lund, Box 7082, 22007, Lund, Sweden.
Phone: +46-46-2229551, Fax:+46-46-2224613, e-mail: hakan.holm@nek.lu.se. This paper was presented at the
1999 annual Meeting of the Public Choice Society in New Orleans. Support from Jan Wallander’s and Tom
Hedelius’ Foundation for Research in the Social Science and Forum för Rättsekonomi are gratefully
acknowledged.2
1. Introduction
It is well known that the willingness to adopt new information is a very important aspect
behind the growth in the market oriented economies around the world. Economic
theoreticians have also long ago pointed out that this process also involves destruction of old
industries and painful adjustments for many parties.
1 Still, the adoption of new relevant ideas
continues since it is a prerequisite for surviving in the market. As a consequence, the question
if competitive firms adopt new information have been superfluous. The question that has
attracted research can instead be formulated as how fast do various firms and industries adopt
new relevant information.
2 However, in the case of non-profit-maximizing organizations we
argue that that the if question is highly relevant. The reason is that when decision makers’
payoffs are affected by other things than the residual income of the organization, they may
have strong incentives to block the arrival of new information.
Let us introduce two neglected aspects that we think are important in how
institutions adopt information. First the institutions’ acquisition of information has economic
consequences that to a certain extent can be foreseen. Secondly, those affected by new
information often have the possibility to affect its adoption. We do not primarily think of such
drastic methods such as keeping things secrete or to refuse disseminating certain information,
but more indirect methods that may delay or hinder the official adoption of information. In
many situations new information concern complex phenomena that never can be known at
certainty. As a consequence it is usually (possible for somebody that is looking hard enough)
to find weaknesses in studies of these phenomena. By pointing at the weaknesses or by
demanding additional studies of the phenomena it is possible to cast doubt about the results or
to postpone that they are officially adopted in a way that most of us (less informed) regard as
                                                          
1 See e.g., Schumpeter (1912).
2 See e.g., studies of technology diffusion like e.g., Mansfield (1961).3
perfectly legitimate. These two aspects imply that there are situations, where the members of
an organization not only know in which ways the official acceptance of information will
affect them, they also have means of avoiding it.
The institutions’ adoption of information affects the overall economic efficiency.
For instance, if we get the information that certain consumption activities are hazardous we
can simply avoid them. Adoption of new information then improves our possibilities of
maximizing our expected utility and hence the efficiency. However, often the impact of new
information may take longer time and is internalized through market prices. For instance,
consider a house market where new (true) information states that wooden houses are more
risky than stone houses, since the former house type is more likely to burn down. In the
perspective of the house owners, the decision to make this an official "truth" can be described
as a zero sum game in the short run; wooden house owners lose on the new information since
the value of their houses decreases and the stone house owners gain. However, in the long run
the stock of houses is not constant since new houses are built and old houses are replaced by
new ones. Ceteris paribus, the new information would cause the proportion of wood houses to
drop in the long run. Through these mechanisms the fire risk for an average house would also
drop and the efficiency in the society would increase.
The aspects mentioned above motivate an attempt to study the problem of
information adoption in a strategic environment, where the organization’s decision to adopt
information is endogenous and affected by different parties self interested strategic
considerations.
There are a limited number of studies that focus on the less obvious intricacies
in the individual agent’s problem of adopting information. First, there are a few studies
inspired by Festinger's (1957) psychological theory of cognitive dissonance, where
individuals minimize inconsistencies between cognition (or adopted information) and actions.4
According to this theory beliefs as well as actions can be changed to reduce the dissonance,
which may have important consequences for economic decision-making as been noted by
Akerlof and Dickens (1982) and Giliad et al. (1987). Secondly, there is a literature including
Levin and Ponssard (1977) and Holm (1997), where the strategic situation motivates fully
rational agents to be uninformed.
There are also a limited number of studies focusing on collective information
acquisition. Austen-Smith and Riker (1987), and Austen-Smith (1990) analyze information
transmission through debates. Gilligan and Krehbiel (1989), and Lohman (1994) study
information acquisition and disclosure in asymmetric information models. Furthermore,
Gersbach (1995) characterize the equilibria in a two-stage voting model where agents may
invest in information before they vote. Gersbach shows that information efficiency is not
always socially optimal. In contrast to these studies the present study takes the starting point
in that information adoption and policy choices are closely related at the organizational level.
3
To focus on the information acquisition, we let the “political struggle” about policies entirely
be channeled through the organization’s decision to adopt information. Furthermore, to
characterize the information that will be accepted or rejected in more narrow terms we make
use of an information concept that allows for this.
4
It is conceivable to perceive our model as a building block for a cognitive
dissonance theory for organizations that are based on self-interested rational individualistic
choices. The fundamental hypothesis is that information that cannot be made consistent with
rules and actions of the organization will not be (officially) adopted.
5 Hence, only information
                                                          
3 Thus, in our model the individual face the problem of voting in favor or against that his organization shall
adopt a certain type of information. The individual’s personal information acquisition problem is not addressed in
our model.
4 Our model also differs from the other papers in some other important respects, for instance, we use a symmetric
information structure and cost-less information.
5 The social component in economic cognitive dissonance models has been noted by Rabin (1994), who argues
that feelings of dissonance can be reinforced or dampened depending on others having the same or different
moral standards.5
that can get sufficient member support to alter the organization’s behavior will be accepted
without causing dissonance.
 The Outline of the Paper
The paper is organized as follows. We start out in section 2 by specifying some of the
problems involved in the process of adopting information and how we are going to model the
problem. Here we also give some examples on situations where the problems we discuss are
applicable.
The concept of information is a relatively vague concept in that different
persons may have different opinions about its meaning. This means that a general analysis of
"adoption of information" would lead to ambiguity if it is not made clear what "information"
stands for. In section 3 we try to overcome this problem by modeling information as statistical
information in the sense of Blackwell. Admittedly, this restricts the analysis somewhat. On
the other hand this choice can be motivated by the fact that in many cases new information
take the form of imperfect statistical data. In addition, this way of modeling information is
fairly established.
6 The analysis reveals that for information to be adopted in the first case it
must describe “the world” such that, if actions were taken on the basis of that description, the
majority would gain. We might say that information that is not "political correct" will be
filtered out in these organizations, which is inefficient since potentially valuable information
will not be taken into account. This result can be regarded as a new interpretation or
"framing" of Black´s (1948) median voter theorem in the context of information adoption.
Whereas the outcome in the median voter theorem is described in some policy dimension over
                                                          
6 See studies that use this concept e.g., Blackwell (1953), Radner and Stiglitz (1984), Kandori (1992), Bassan
and Scarsini (1995).6
which the voters have given preferences and information, the outcome in this analysis
describes the characteristics of the information that are politically acceptable given that it has
distinct policy implications.
2. The Problem
We will consider problems where a group of agents collectively make a decision of whether
to adopt new information or not. If the information is adopted it will have consequences for
the agents’ payoffs.
7 Information adoption occurs when a critical mass of agents are willing to
accept the information and thereby (through the given decision mechanism) are able to govern
the organization to take actions based on the new information.
To fit our general characterization above it is natural to think of situations where
there is a considerable amount of uncertainty and where additional information arrives as the
experience grows. Mutual risk sharing is one example of such a situation. It has been argued
by Skogh (1999) that mutual risk-sharing can be regarded as an institutional response to
genuine uncertainty. As experience grows the information about risks will get more accessible
and contractual solutions (designed by new institutions) can be based on the new risk
assessments. Our house example below can be considered as a situation where the initial
information about the risks is relatively primitive and where the new imperfect information
provides the organization with potentially valuable experience.
                                                          
7 Hence, we restrict our analysis to the kind of information that has a potential value in that agents may take
actions based on it to change the organization. The question of whether individual agents really believe in the
information or not is left open. They might believe in it or they might not and chose to accept a certain view
since they will gain on it.7
Example 1: Mutual risk sharing: Suppose that a group of house owners have formed a mutual
risk-sharing pool in order to reduce their individual risk exposure to fire damages.
8 Assume
that the pool only consists of owners of wooden houses and stone houses. Furthermore,
assume that somebody presents new data suggesting that the probability for a stone house to
burn down is less than the corresponding probability for a wooden house. If this information
is adopted it is reasonable to assume that the premiums in the pool will be adjusted so that
each member pay their expected damage cost. Hence, premiums for wooden houses would
increase relative to stone houses. The decision to adopt and implement such information is
typically a majority decision where all members may participate (e.g., the annual meeting) or
by a representative subset of the pool members (e.g., a board) that reflects the pool’s
composition of agents.
The example above is chosen for its simplicity rather than for its current
actuality.
  More recent examples include risk-sharing pools in national industries and
internationally between states.
9 The rules of these associations are typically the result from
negotiations among the pool members. The possibilities to make alterations in the statues are
more or less difficult and may require qualified majority or full consensus.
The risks considered above are more or less associated with privately owned
objects. However, our analysis can also be applied to institutions dealing with collective risks,
where the parties have different costs for the risk.
Example 2: Environmental Problems: The last decades many research reports have expressed
concern that various green house gases are about to cause a global climate change. Although,
uncertainty remains concerning what the exact effects would be from a global climate change
                                                          
8 See Hägg (1998) for an analysis of early mutual risk sharing arrangements in Sweden concerning fires.
9 One example is the conventions between nuclear power states. See e.g., the "Vienna Convention on Civil
Liability for Nuclear Damage of 21 May 1963 " at http://www.iaea.org/worldatom/updates/annex1.html and the8
and concerning what the most efficient preventative measures are, there seems to be a certain
consensus among experts concerning certain effects and certain preventative methods.
10 For
instance, as the global temperature rises the water level is expected to increase. As a
consequence there is a probability that some low lands that currently are just above the water
level will be flooded. For this reason (and a lot of other reasons) although global climate
change will affect us all, the effects (and hence the cost) will be more serious for some
countries than for others. For instance, countries with a large fractions of its territory lying in
the low lands and/or that are situated in the tropical or subtropical climate zones face more
serious effects.
There are also a number of risk factors that produce the global climate change.
The short term cost for a country to help preventing a global climate change will depend on
what factors prevention should focus on. For instance, if prevention concentrates on carbon
dioxide emissions, those countries with an industry structure and energy system that highly
relies on fossil fuels would have the highest prevention costs. The global climate change calls
for an internationally coordinated environmental policy based on the available information
from the scientific community. However, before such a policy can be efficiently implemented,
the international community must agree upon what scientific information to take into account.
This may not be easy since different countries have different incentives. Whereas some
countries may be very anxious to attack the problem since the climate change would cause
them great harm, other countries that have little reason to worry may be unwilling to
implement costly preventive policies before they are absolutely certain about the mechanisms
involved. In addition to this, new information about risk factors that have implications for the
                                                                                                                                                                                    
"Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage" at
http://www.iaea.org/worldatom/updates/annex2.html.
10 See, however Lomborg (1998) for a critical discussion and statistical analysis of the World Watch Reports.9
countries’ prevention costs may be blocked by coalitions of countries that would be negatively




By information different people mean different things. To get our analysis stringent we shall
present how we model information in this section.
In many cases information about uncertain phenomena is not perfectly
discernable, which means that some kind of statistical method must be used. The probabilistic
aspects of such a method are captured by a message service.
 12 We will consider the simplest
type of message service that emits one out of two possible messages concerning each agent’s
type, where one message is favorable and the other is unfavorable. We will assume that the
agent’s type is associated to some underlying cost function and that each agent is either a high
cost type or a low cost type. A message service can then formally be represented by a
likelihood matrix,  [] m q L · = q , where  m q · q  represents the probability that the message is
{} 2 , 1 Î m  if the agent is of type  {} 2 , 1 Î q . Let 1 denote the low cost type and favorable
message and let 2 denote the high cost type and the unfavorable message, respectively. To get
an intuition for these notions we will apply them on Example 1 above.
                                                          
11 In the light of this, the watered down results of the United Nations Conference on Environment &
Development in Rio 1992 should not come as a surprise. For instance, in the chapter describing Protection of the
Atmospere in Agenda 21, the most concrete action suggested is the generation of additional scientific
information (see gopher://unephq.unep.org/11/un/unced/agenda21).
12 For an introduction to message services and imperfect information see e.g., chapter 5 in Hirshleifer and Riley,
1992.10
Let us assume that the true fire risk for houses depends on a large numbers of
variables that are difficult to observe or measure. However, building material is one variable
that give some but not all information about the risks. Now, for simplicity assume that there
are only two true types of houses: low risk houses and high risk houses.
13 However, the
information to distinguish the true low risk from the high risk types is not accessible for the
agents. Thus, they are symmetrically unaware about the true types. Suppose that new
information states that 60% and 40% of all true low risk houses are built by stone and wood,
respectively. This means that  6 . 0 1 1 = * q  and  4 . 0 2 1 = * q . The new message service also states
that 30% of the true high risk houses are stone houses and that the corresponding figure is
70% for wood houses. We then have that  3 . 0 1 2 = * q  and  7 . 0 2 2 = * q . Note again, that although
we assume that everybody has access to this statistical information (i.e., the agents have
symmetric information about the message service), nobody can be certain about the true type
of a given house, since the information is imperfect. A more formal way of saying this is that
1 0 < < ·m qq  for all q  and m.
Two unconditional probabilities are critical in determining the probability that
the agent (or in the example above, the house) is of a certain type given a certain message.
The first is the unconditional probability that a given message is received and the second is
the unconditional probability that a randomly selected agent is of a certain type. Denote the
former by  m q (for message m) and the latter by  q p  (for type q). Suppose in the example above
that the risk sharing pool consists of 40 stone houses and 60 wooden houses. Hence, since the
message concerns building material the probabilities that a randomly selected house is made
in stone and wood are then given by  4 . 0 1 = q  and  6 . 0 2 = q , respectively. Although,  q p  is not
directly given it can be computed with the information given above, since we know that for
                                                          
13 Clearly, low risk houses correspond to the low cost type and the high risk houses correspond to the high cost
type.11
40% percent of the houses the message is stone house and that the stone houses can be
divided into low risks and high risks. Thus, if we knew  q p  we could apply the values on
m q · q , since consistency requires that  () 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 · · - + = q q q p p . Plugging the values into this
expression we get  () 3 . 0 1 6 . 0 4 . 0 1 1 p p - + =  and  3 1 1 = p . Thus, 1/3 of all houses are (true)
low risks and 2/3 are (true) high risks.
The agents can now use this information to improve their predictions about the
houses’ risks. According to Bayes’ rule the probability that a randomly selected agent is of
type q contingent upon that message m is received is given by  m m m q q · · = q q q p p . Thus, the
probability that a stone house is a (true) low risk object is  2 1 1 1 = · p  and the corresponding
probability for a wooden house is  9 2 2 1 = · p .
In the following, we shall use the convention that  2 1 1 1 · · ³p p  and that  1 2 2 2 · · ³p p
(i.e., the probability that an agent is a low cost type is higher if the message is 1 than if it is 2,
and the probability for the agent to be a high cost type is higher if the message is 2 than if it is
1). This means that if someone wants to form a risk sharing pool with low risks he will only
accept a prospective member if he is associated with the favorable message (i.e., message 1).
 The Model
We shall mainly confine the analysis to a situation, where there are only two true types. Thus,
there are  1 n  and  2 n  low and high cost agents respectively, where the total number of agents
is  2 1 n n n + = . The expected net costs of a low cost agent and a high cost agent are a and c,
respectively. The total cost of the organization will then be  c n a n 2 1 + . Without any additional
information about the types we assume that they will all pay the same amount. To satisfy the12
budget constraint each will pay a premium equal to () () p p - + = + 1 2 1 c a n c n a n , where
1 p p = . (Note that with random selection we have that  () n n 1 = p .)
Below we will study the organization’s decision to adopt new information. If
new information is adopted the premiums will be set consistent with the adopted
information.
14 With some exception we will confine the analysis to message services
containing only two messages. The expected cost (and the premium) for an agent associated
with message m is then  () ( ) c a C E m m m · · - + = 1 1 1 p p . If the information is not accepted the
agent will receive the status quo payoff.
We have now described the main components of our model and its time
structure is illustrated in Figure 1. There are three phases; a presentation phase, a decision
phase and finally a payoff phase.
3.2 The Cost of Imperfect Information
It is fundamental in economics that decisions should be based on expected costs given all
available information. If not, too much will be produced of those goods and services that are
priced below their true expected costs and too little will be produced of those goods that are
priced above their true cost. In the case of perfect information a favorable message would
point out the low cost agents with certainty (i.e.,  1 1 1 = · p  and  ) 0 2 1 = · p , and the unfavorable
message would only be emitted for high cost agents (i.e.,  0 1 2 = · p  and  1 2 2 = · p ). If such a
                                                          
14 Clearly, there are different ways to design sharing rules. However, we think that it is reasonable to assume that
everybody in the pool and pay fair premiums according to whatever information about the costs that the pool has
adopted or accepted. One reason for this is that a different sharing principle would create dissonance in the
organization. For instance, it is easy to imagine that "tensions" would be created if everybody received the same13
message service was available the agents could exactly pay their expected costs (i.e., the low
and high risk types would pay a and c, respectively)
As we will analyze imperfect information situations, it is important to be able to
order different degrees of "imperfectness" in information. In fact, this is possible to a certain
extent. Following the literature on information economics we will say that a message service
’ m  is more informative than a message service m  if  1 1 1 1 ’ · · >p p  and  2 1 2 1 ’ · · <p p  holds.
15 An
important consequence of this is that a more informative message service will reduce the
average mistake in assigning costs to the agents and therefore lead to higher economic
efficiency.
16
3.3 Criteria for Adoption of New information
From the reasoning above we conclude that it is efficient for the institutions to adopt
informative message services. We will now study two institutional arrangements to see how
they perform with respect to information adoption.
                                                                                                                                                                                    
payoff from the organization at the same time as it was an “official truth” that there were clearly defined groups
with different levels of net inputs (or productivity).
15 See Hirschleifer and Riley (1992) chapter 5.
16 Let us illustrate this cost of mistakes by a simple estimation and call the associated cost for the average cost
bias (b ). To estimate b  for a given message service note that since the true types are unknown under imperfect
information the expected cost for an agent associated with message m is  () m C E . Now, if the agent really is a low
cost type he pays  () a C E m-  too much and he pays  () m C E c -  too little if he is a high cost type. Thus, the
expected size of the mistake for an agent receiving message m will be
() () ( ) ( ) () m m m m m C E c a C E - - + - = · · 1 1 1 p p e  and the overall average cost bias will then be  2 2 1 1 e e b q q + = .
Clearly, with perfect information the average cost bias is zero. If we compare two imperfect message services for
which the unconditional prior probabilities are the same, then the more informative message services will have
the lowest average cost bias. To see this, one could imagine a central authority with a payoff function negatively
related to the average cost bias and apply the analysis in Hirshleifer and Riley (1992) chapter 5.14
The Competitive Market Solution
To understand the political restrictions in information adoption it is instructive to start the
analysis by asking how firms in a competitive market would adopt new information. Let us
delimit the case to a market for the fire risks described in Example 1. Note that since we do
not assume any informational asymmetries and since the labels (i.e., the “stone house” or
“wooden house”) are assumed to be common knowledge, we can expect that with risk-neutral
insurers competition will force the market to adopt all information that can be used to
differentiate the premiums according to the risk categories. The reason for this is that the
insurance firms have incentives to base new contracts on the new information. Thus, in
equilibrium everybody pay their expected damage cost based on the available information.
To see this assume that the true yearly expected damage cost for low and high
risk houses are 1500 and 3000, respectively. Since one third of all houses are low risks and
two thirds high risks the premium without any information should be: (1/3)*1500
+(2/3)*3000= 2500. Now, if the information that the building material affects the fire risks in
the way described above, some firms will be tempted to offer a more attractive contract to
stone house owners. Since half the stone houses are low risk the competitive premium will be:
(1/2) *1500 + (½)3000= 2250. The stone house owners will accept this contract and thus pay
their expected damage cost which will generally given by  () ( ) c a C E m m m · · - + = 1 1 1 p p . This
means that information is used as long as some subcategory can gain on its use (i.e., receive
lower premiums). As a consequence the available information on damage costs are
internalized in the premiums and will be taken into account when new houses are built. We
can then make the following standard observation.
Observation 1: Any information that can be used to improve the differentiation of
subcategories’ expected costs will be exploited in a competitive equilibrium.15
Majority Rule
Let us now study the decision to adopt new information in organizations governed by the
majority rule.
17 If the agents maximize their individual utilities and only consider the expected
cost in various situations we can conclude that new information is adopted if and only if more
than the required majority gain if it is exploited. For instance, without any information about
building material all house owners (in Example 1) share the risk equally so that each member
pays the average expected cost, i.e. 2500. However, if the information about building material
is adopted according to an expected cost based sharing principle the stone house owners
should pay:  () 2250 2 1 * 3000 2 1 * 1500 1 1 1 1 1 = + = - + · · c a p p  and the wood house owners
should pay  () 2667 9 7 * 3000 9 2 * 1500 1 2 1 2 1 = + = - · · c a p p .
What is then the criterion for adoption of new information? As we shall see
below the adoption of information is contingent upon if the message service assigns a set of
labels that are favorable to the required majority.
Observation 2: In the case of two types and two messages the condition for adopting new
information requires that the profitability and majority constraint below are satisfied:
 18
i) Profitability:  () c a 1 1 1 11 · · - + > p p a , where a  denotes the status quo premium (i.e., the
premium paid without new information).
ii) Majority:  s q > 1 , where s is the required majority. (In the case of simple majority,
2 1 = s .)
                                                          
17 We assume that it is not possible or prohibitively costly to exit.
18 Remember that message 1 is assumed to be the favorable message.16
These conditions describe acceptable information in terms of the parameters of
the message service. Note that these criteria are not connected to efficient adoption of
information. Newly adopted information may be either informative or uninformative, which
means that the expected cost of mistakes may decrease or increase. We generalize this result
for information described by message services with an arbitrary number of types and
messages in Appendix 1. In the same appendix we show that the spirit of Observation 2 also
is carried over to the case where the status quo payoff differs among groups.
If we apply Observation 2 on our house example and assume the simple
majority rule, it should be clear that the information about building material will not be
adopted in the risk sharing pool if we start out from a situation where there is no information
about the house types. The reason is that the fraction of the favored majority constitutes a
minority (i.e.,  s q = < = 5 . 0 4 . 0 1 ). The majority of wooden house owners will block the
adoption since instead of paying 2500 they will pay 2667 if the information is adopted.
Let us now assume that there is another but less informative message service
available saying that the roof construction is associated with fire risks in that non-straw roofs
are less risky than straw roofs. Suppose, that this information can be described by a message
service having the following probabilities:  5 3
’
1 1 = · q ,  5 2
’
2 1 = · q ,  2 1
’
1 2 = · q  and  2 1
’
2 2 = · q ,
where 
’
1 1· q  gives the probability that a low risk house has a non-straw roof, 
’
2 1· q  gives the
probability that a low risk house has a straw roof, and so forth. If we assume the same prior
probability for a true low (and high) risk house as before (i.e.,  3 1
’
1 = p ), the probability for a
house to be a low risk that has a non-straw roof is given by  8 3
’
1 1 = · p . The corresponding
probability for a house with straw roof is only  7 2
’
2 1 = · p . In this case the majority ( 15 8
’
1 = q )
will receive the favorable message (that is “non straw roof”) and consequently vote in favor of
adoption. If the information is adopted the premiums will be  5 . 2437 8 5 * 3000 8 3 * 1500 = +17
for the non-straw houses and  2571 7 5 * 3000 7 2 * 1500 = + .4 for straw houses. We can then
conclude that although the information about roof construction is less informative concerning
fire risks compared to information about building material, the former will be adopted but not
the latter. Thus, the political correctness of information is more critical than its efficiency or
informativeness.
4. General Conclusions and Implications
This paper takes the position that the adoption of information is a complicated process
endowed with strategic considerations. New information often suggests organizational actions
that will affect various groups’ payoffs at the same time as new information can be blocked or
severely delayed.
We have analyzed the decision to adopt of information in organizations where
the majority decides. In order to do this we applied an already developed framework in which
information can be described as a probabilistic message service over a set of types. Two of
our main conclusions can be summarized in the following points.
* Political Correctness. For information to be adopted it must describe “the world” in such a
way that, if actions were taken on the basis of that description, the majority gains. In our
model this means that the probability for favorable messages for members of the organization
(i.e.,  1 q ) must be sufficiently high. This result should be intuitive as a new alternative
interpretation of the median voter theorem in terms of "political" information acquisition.
As a consequence, our results also give a more balanced picture on the
efficiency of the majority decision rule under uncertainty. Under different assumptions, the18
Condorcet jury theorem states that majority decisions will improve the likelihood that the
decision is correct.
 19 Our result shows that the majority rule may block the adoption of
valuable information under uncertainty. Hence, we demonstrate a new way in which the
majority rule may fail to generate efficient decisions.
* The quality of information. Informative signals will improve the cost assessments in the
economy even if they are imperfect. Efficiency requires that messages that provide better
information about costs will be taken into account. With majority decisions the quality of
information will not directly matter as long as the prior probabilities for the messages (i.e.,
i q :s) and the prior probability for the various types (i.e.,  i p :s) are unchanged.
From what has been said many implications ought to suggest themselves. At a
general level we provide an alternative theory for weak performance for non- profit
organizations that is based on malfunctioning information acquisition. As a consequence,
organizations that should be keen on adopting new information should not be subject to
majority decisions if those involved will be affected by the information. If this happens our
model demonstrates that there is a risk that political correct rather than conclusive information
will be generated.
                                                          
19 For the Condorcet jury theorem see Ladha (1993) and Berg (1993). The foundations of Condorcet’s jury
theorem have been criticized by Austen-Smith and Banks (1996). However, Wit (1998) restores Condorcet’s
result in the presence of mixed strategies.19
Appendix 1
Generalization 1: It is easy to generalize Observation 2 by considering the arrival of new
information that can be described by a message service m  described over n true types and z
messages. Let us start by indexing the messages according to how favorable they are in terms
of their expected costs conditional on the message. Thus, let  1 = m  for the message associated
with the lowest expected cost and  z m =  for the message with the highest expected cost. Let
us index the expected costs for the true types by  n c c c c ,..., , , 3 2 1 .
20 We can then state our next
observation:
Observation 2´: New information will be adopted if it is described by a message service for
which there is a message m satisfying both i and ii) below:
i)  m n n m m m c c c c · · · · + + + + > p p p p a ... 3 3 2 2 1 1
ii) s q q q q m > + + + ... 3 2 1 .
Clearly, those groups of agents associated by message 1, 2, 3,...., m will vote in
favor since all get cost reductions with the new information according to i. Furthermore ii
conditions that these agents constitute a majority.
21
Generalization 2: It is also possible to have different status quo premiums for those receiving
the same new message and for those receiving different messages. This makes things a little
                                                          
20 These terms correspond to a and c for the low and high cost type in our example.
21 Note that qi is a probability but it can be interpreted as proportion of the agents in a model with random
selection.20
more complicated. In this case a group that gets the same label (or message) by the new
message service may consist of one fraction gaining on the information (because of high
status quo premiums) and one group that is loosing (because of low status quo premiums).
Suppose the status quo allocation is based on the message service  m ’ with y different










+ £ i i a a . Now,
denote the cost for the group that receives message m in the new message service by
() m n n m m m m c c c c C E · · · · + + + + = p p p p ... 3 3 2 2 1 1 . For each group receiving a message m in the
new message service we can define the y subgroups’ net benefits from switching to the new






1 ,...., , , a a a a . Now, for each group
receiving a message m in the new message service define  m v  as the fraction of the population
whose net benefit is strictly positive (i.e., those subgroups i such that:  () 0
’ > - m i C E a ).
22 As
we have included the profitability criterion in the definition of  m v  we can simplify the
observation as follows:
Observation 2´´: New information described by m  will be adopted if
s v q v q v q v q z z > + + + + .... 3 3 2 2 1 1 .
Thus, our generalizations confirm the earlier conclusion (see Observation 2) that for
information to be adopted it is not critical that it is informative, but only that the information
is favorable to the majority.
                                                          
22 For instance,  45 . 0 3 = v  means that 45 percent of those receiving message 3 get an increase in their payoff with
the new information. .21
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